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Article
The Dakota Access Pipeline and the Destruction
of Cultural Heritage: Applying the Crime Against
Humanity of Persecution Before the ICC
Haydee J. Dijkstal
Abstract
The controversy surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline
has included claims by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that sites of religious and cultural
significance including burial grounds are directly in the
pipeline’s planned route and would be destroyed by construction.
This article aims to determine whether construction of the
Dakota Access Pipeline violates international human rights and
criminal law, and could leave corporation officials most
responsible for the pipeline construction and operation
vulnerable to investigation or prosecution for the crime against
humanity of persecution before the International Criminal
Court. The article examines how human rights law and the case
law of international tribunals establish that the destruction of
cultural property can constitute the denial of a fundamental
right rising to the level of persecution as a crime against
humanity. Examining the decision of the International Criminal
Court to, for the first time, investigate and prosecute the
destruction of cultural heritage, such as tombs and Mausoleums
in Mali, as a war crime, the article sets out how the destruction
of cultural property outside of an armed conflict could be
pursued as a crime against humanity. The article concludes that
there is a strong case to argue that the pipeline’s construction
would fit within the definition of a crime against humanity of
persecution before the ICC, leaving corporation officials within
the jurisdiction of the ICC vulnerable to a complaint and action


Haydee Dijkstal is an attorney practicing international criminal and
human rights law.
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before the ICC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instances where cultural heritage is threatened or
destroyed in times of peace often particularly affect indigenous
peoples.1 For Native American tribes in the United States, sites
and objects which are of cultural significance and importance are
increasingly under threat as a result of commercial development
ventures and interests.2
This issue has been raised in regards to both the Dakota
Access Pipeline and the Keystone Pipeline, where the
construction and subsequent operation of both pipelines
threaten the destruction, or have already destroyed, sites of
cultural heritage and importance such as ancestral graves, and
sites and objects of religious and cultural significance.3 After it
was reported on November 16, 2017 that 210,000 gallons of oil
spilled during the operation of the Keystone Pipeline in South
Dakota near the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation of
the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe,4 a US District Court
recognized that the Dakota Access Pipeline presents a similar
risk to the land of several tribes, including the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, whose land
runs along the path of the pipeline, and that ongoing monitoring
of the risks posed by the pipeline is required.5 Similarly, the
1. See Karima Bennoune: Cultural Heritage is a Human Rights Issue,
HAKAM (Oct. 25, 2016), https://hakam.org.my/wp/2016/10/25/karima-bennounecultural-heritage-is-a-human-rights-issue/.
2. Steve Dubb, Native Americans Face Environmental Threats from
Alaska to New Mexico, NPQ (Oct. 9, 2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
2017/10/09/native-americans-face-environmental-threats-alaska-new-mexico/.
3. See, e.g., infra pp. 163–68; Steven Mufson & Chris Mooney, Keystone
Pipeline Spills 210,000 Gallons of Oil on Eve of Permitting Decision for
TransCanada, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/16/keystone-pipeline-spills-210000gallons-of-oil-on-eve-of-key-permitting-decision; Valerie Volcovici & Richard
Valdmanis, Keystone’s Existing Pipeline Spills Far More Than Predicted to
Regulators, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-pipeline-keystone-spills/keystones-existing-pipeline-spills-far-morethan-predicted-to-regulators-idUSKBN1DR1CS.
4. See, e.g., Mitch Smith & Julie Bosman, Keystone Pipeline Leaks 210,000
Gallons of Oil in South Dakota, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/keystone-pipeline-leaks-southdakota.html.
5. Memorandum Opinion at 5, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 280 F.Supp.3d 187 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-1534 (JEB)).
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recent actions to revoke and replace the Bear Ears Monument,
and the protections covering large areas containing “hundreds of
thousands of objects of historic and scientific importance, many
traditional cultural properties, and many sacred sites” prompted
the Hope Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Indian Tribe, Ute Mountain
Ute Tribe, and Zuni Tribe to take civil action alleging that the
removed protections opens these lands up to private oil and gas
development which could cause “significant and irreversible
damage to this culturally important landscape.”6
The ICC set an important precedent that individuals who
are most responsible for the destruction of cultural heritage
could be held criminally responsible under international law for
the commission of a war crime with the International Criminal
Court’s recent conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, an alleged
member of the militant group Ansar Eddine, for “intentionally
attacking” historic monuments and buildings dedicated to
religion such as mausoleums and a mosque.7
This article focuses on events regarding the construction
and operation of the Dakota Access Pipeline and considers
instances where objects and sites of cultural significance and
importance have been threatened or destroyed. For the purpose
of analysis, the article focuses, as a means of example or case
study, on one documented instance where allegations have been
made that cultural heritage was destroyed in South Dakota by
construction efforts on the pipeline.8 The article will examine
these events through the lens of international criminal law to
consider whether actions by the corporations involved in the
construction of the pipeline, which led to the destruction and
irreparable damage of cultural and religious heritage sites to the
Tribes, could be investigated and prosecuted before the ICC
when the destruction of these sites occurs outside of an armed
conflict.
The article demonstrates how the Rome Statute similarly
allows for the destruction of cultural heritage to be addressed by
the Court when it occurs outside of an armed conflict by
examining the decision of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) to investigate and prosecute, for the first time, the
destruction of cultural heritage in Mali as a war crime. The
6. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Relief at 45, Hopi
Tribe, v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017).
7. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, Judgment and Sentence,
¶ 64 (Sept. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Al-Mahdi Judgment].
8. Infra pp. 163–68.
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article proposes that Article 7 of the Rome Statute allows for the
destruction or damage of cultural heritage outside of an armed
conflict to be pursued as a crime against humanity of
persecution.
In order to make this determination, the article will first
review the background of the sites of cultural and religious
heritage which were either destroyed or damaged by
construction of the pipeline. Second, the article will review the
development of protections for cultural property and heritage
under international law which has become part of customary
international law. Third, the article will describe the case law of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
which has demonstrated a clear practice of applying individual
criminal responsibility for the destruction of cultural property
and heritage as a crime against humanity of persecution.
Considering that this application of the crime against humanity
of persecution before the ICTY concerned only instances of
destruction and damage during an armed conflict, the article
will examine the required elements for a crime against
humanity of persecution committed during times of peace under
the Rome Statute. While the article will set out the contextual
elements required for proving the commission of a crime against
humanity of persecution, the focus of it will remain on how the
underlying crime of persecution can be applied to situations
where cultural heritage is damage or destroyed during times of
peace.
The article will conclude that the destruction and damage of
cultural heritage can be considered an underlying act for the
crime of persecution as a crime against humanity before the ICC,
and that there is a strong case to argue that the pipeline’s
construction would fit within the definition of a crime against
humanity of persecution before the ICC.
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
This article considers the question of whether instances
during the construction and operation of the Dakota Access
Pipeline, which resulted in the destruction of cultural heritage,
could constitute a crime against humanity of persecution under
the Rome Statute. The analysis that follows considers only the
definition and application of a crime against humanity of
persecution under Article 7 of the Rome Statute with an in-depth
analysis of the required preliminary issues which must be
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considered before a particular prosecution or investigation can
be initiated; namely jurisdiction and gravity.
While this article’s primary aim is to provide an analysis of
the application of the crime against humanity to an instance of
destruction of cultural heritage without making a conclusion on
the likelihood of an investigation or prosecution into the events
concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, this paper is not
presented merely in the abstract. The issues of jurisdiction and
gravity are hurdles which will be considered, crossed, and
possibly be met. A cursory look indicates that they are.
Jurisdiction before the ICC would affect the practical ability
of the ICC to address the events surrounding the Dakota Access
Pipeline. Because the United States is not a member of the Rome
Statute, the Court would not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute crimes taking place on its territory unless the United
States voluntarily lodged an Article 12(3) declaration to accept
the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the crimes, or if the UN
Security Council took a decision to refer the crimes to the ICC as
a matter affecting peace and security under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.9 As the US is not likely to voluntarily subject itself
to the jurisdiction of the ICC anytime soon, and the UN Security
Council would be unlikely to find that the events concerning the
pipeline are a threat to peace and security, the other option for
achieving jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the suspect
or accused. Article 12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute grants
jurisdiction over crimes where the suspect or accused is a
national of a State Party to the Statute.10 It is possible that
corporate officials responsible for ownership or construction of
the pipeline who are nationals of an ICC member State could fall
under the jurisdiction of the Court, and be held individually
criminally responsible.11
The gravity of the potential cases which would arise before
the ICC must also be noted as a hurdle which must be addressed
before any movement could practically be made with an
investigation or prosecution on this topic before the ICC. As an
issue regarding the admissibility, an assessment of whether
these cases would meet the gravity threshold under Article

9. U.N. Charter art. 39–51.
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.12, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
11. See How the Court Works, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-thecourt-works (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
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53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute12 considers “the scale, nature, and
manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact, bearing
in mind the potential cases that would be likely to arise from an
investigation of the situation.”13
In the Al-Mahdi case, the Prosecution found sufficient
gravity in regard to the destruction of religious and historical
sites based on these factors. In short, the scale of the potential
crimes was demonstrated by a “series of attacks” against
significant sites,14 and the nature of the crimes was affected
because the Prosecution found the events affect sites and objects
“whose value transcends geographical boundaries, and which
are unique in character and are intimately associated with the
history and culture of the people.”15 The manner of the
commission of the crimes was affected by the repeated instances
of destruction and the impact of the crimes was demonstrated
because they “shocked the conscience of humanity.”16
A similar analysis could be conducted for the cases
concerning the destruction of cultural heritage as a result of
construction and operation of the Dakota access pipeline. While
this paper only addresses one instance of destruction as a case
study to whether the crime against humanity of persecution
could be applied, the construction of the pipeline resulted in the
destruction of cultural heritage, along the entire course of the
pipeline.17 When analyzing the possibility of bringing potential
cases of destruction of cultural heritage concerning construction
along the entire pipeline, it seems that all four gravity factors –
scale, nature, impact and manner of commission of the crime –
are met. In regards to the scale and manner of commission of the
potential crimes, these factors could be demonstrated by the
repeated acts of destruction. When assessing the nature of the
potential crimes in accordance with the elements of the crime
against humanity of persecution under Article 7(1)(h) which
requires the deprivation of “fundamental rights”, it can be
12. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 53(1)(c).
13. Policy Paper of Preliminary Examinations, ¶ 9, ICC (Nov. 2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_
Examinations_2013-ENG.pdf.
14. Situation in Mali Article 53(1) Report, ¶ 154, ICC, (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG
16Jan2013.pdf [hereinafter Mali Article 53(1) Report].
15. Id. ¶ 155 (citing Y. Sandoz and others, “Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949”).
16. Id. ¶ 156–57.
17. Infra pp. 163–65.
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demonstrated that the nature of the crimes is sufficient to meet
the gravity threshold considering that the objects and sites
destroyed included burial sites and ancestral graves, and stone
rings and effigies which were unique and significant to the
cultural and history of the tribes, as noted further below.18 In
regards to impact, as discussed further below, the tribes affected
by the destruction have set out the grave impact of the potential
crimes on their cultural and history, and the protests and
national controversy surrounding the pipeline demonstrate the
effect these acts have had nationally and internationally.19 This
short breakdown of each factor in the gravity assessment shows
that a finding of sufficient gravity is possible.
Therefore, there is a possibility that the issues of both
jurisdiction and gravity could be overcome to allow an
investigation and prosecution, but a final conclusion on these
matters would depend fully on the facts of the allegations and
the evidence provided. This would require further analysis.
III.

SITES OF CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
HERITAGE

Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline was completed
in April 2017 and first deliveries through the pipeline
commenced on May 14, 2018.20 On June 1, 2017, it was
announced that commercial service began through the Pipeline
transporting crude oil from Bakken, North Dakota to Pakota,
Illinois.21
Since the intention to build the pipeline was announced in
June 2014, there has been significant opposition to its
construction due to the pipeline’s planned route along and near
the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in North Dakota.22 A
18. ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
10
(2011),
https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/
ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [hereinafter ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES].
19. Infra pp. 163–68, 208, 209.
20. Jarrett Renshaw, East Coast Refiner Shuns Bakken Delivery as Dakota
Access Pipeline Starts, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2017, 11:38 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-dakota-pipeline-pes-idUSKBN17L0B
J.
21. Timothy Cama, Dakota Access Pipeline Now in Service, HILL (June 1,
2017, 10:02 AM EDT), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/335898dakota-access-pipeline-now-in-service.
22. Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1–6, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
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number of Native American tribes along the path of the pipeline,
including the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe, argued that the pipeline’s construction would
significantly destroy or irreparably damage sites of cultural
importance to the Tribe’s cultural and religious heritage,
including burial sites and other culturally significant sites which
were either in the direct path of the pipeline or nearby.23
Pipeline construction crews graded a stretch of land, which
destroyed many cultural sites, that were identified in legal
proceedings, such as burial grounds, rock cairns, and stone
structures.24 Even after on-going protests, warnings on adverse
cultural effects,25 Tribes opposing the granting of construction
permits26, and a request for injunctive relief,27 these sites were
still destroyed or irreparably damaged.
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe have consistently argued that construction of the
pipeline would harm and destroy “historically and religiously
important” sites to both Tribes.28 To highlight the adverse
effects, the Tribes have “participated extensively in the public
process associated with the permits, including filing numerous
formal technical and legal comments[s,]”29 and have provided
legal submissions and evidence that show how culturally and
historically significant the sites in the pipeline’s path are to the

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2017)
[hereinafter Memorandum of Feb. 14, 2017].
23. See Declaration of Jon Eagle, Sr. in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction ¶¶ 3, 12, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Eagle Declaration of Aug.
4, 2016].
24. Declaration of Tim Mentz, Sr. in Support of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order ¶¶ 2–5, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Mentz Declaration
of Sept. 4, 2016].
25. See, e.g., Declaration of Dave Archambault II in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Archambault
Declaration of Aug. 3, 2016].
26. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 80, Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. July 27,
2016) [hereinafter Complaint of July 27, 2016].
27. Id. ¶ 1.
28. Memorandum of Feb. 14, 2017, supra note 22, at 7–9; Memorandum in
Support of Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 3,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB)
(D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum of Sept. 4, 2016].
29. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26.
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Tribes, as well as how these sites are in risk of damage and
destruction. 30 The evidence set out the extent of damage caused
by the pipeline would be along the “entire 1,100 [mile] route of
the pipeline”.31
It is acknowledged that concerns have been voiced about the
effect of construction and operation of the pipeline along many
parts of its routes from North Dakota to Illinois.32 Likewise,
arguments made about the adverse effect of the pipeline have
ranged from the destruction of cultural heritage to the
environmental impact of the pipeline to water sources near the
pipeline.33 The range of concerns on the pipeline’s effect on the
Tribes are not limited to destruction and damage to burial
grounds and sites of religious and cultural worship, but also the
Tribe’s relationship with water sources, such as the Missouri
River and Lake Oahe in North and South Dakota, which are
“sacred to the [Standing Rock Sioux Tribe] and are central to the
Tribe’s practice of religion.”34 However, for the purpose of this
article, the destruction and damage of cultural heritage in one
instance will be examined to use this instance as a case study on
its application to international criminal law, without
disregarding the fact that cultural heritage was affected in many
other locations along the pipeline.
This article will focus on the damage and destruction to sites
of religious and cultural heritage to the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe near Canon Ball, North
Dakota and for which legal submissions were submitted to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.35 The evidence
included declarations filed by several experts on tribal historical
preservation for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe36 as well as by

30. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶¶ 76–80; Supplemental
Declaration of Tim Mentz, Sr. in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
¶¶ 11–16, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534
(JEB) (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Mentz Declaration of Sept. 2, 2016].
31. Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶ 17.
32. Id. ¶ 40.
33. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶¶ 74–76.
34. Id. ¶¶ 77–79; Memorandum of Feb. 14, 2017, supra note 22, at 4.
35. See Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26.
36. See, e.g., Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24; Mentz
Declaration of Sept. 2, 2016, supra note 30; Declaration of Tim Mentz, Sr. in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2016) [hereinafter
Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016]; Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra
note 23.

166

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1

the Chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.37 The
submissions and evidence specifically noted that “[c]onstruction
of the pipeline, which includes clearing and grading a 100–150
foot access pathway nearly 1200 miles long, digging a trench as
deep as 10 feet, and building and burying the pipeline, would
destroy burial grounds, sacred sites, and historically significant
areas on either side of Lake Oahe.”38 The expert declarations
stated that these sites which are of cultural and religious
significant to not only the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, but also the Mandan and the
Arikara tribes, were either in the direct path of the pipeline, or
in close enough vicinity that the effects of construction would
irreparably damage or destroy the sites.39 It was submitted that
construction would “without a doubt” destroy these historical
and cultural sites.40
Stone structures were one of the most prevalent cultural
sites that risked damage and destruction. The cultural and
spiritual significance of these sites were explained as sites where
Tribal members “made commitments for the people and where
spiritual pledges were fulfilled” and where an individual would
find “vital spiritual connection through prayer and commitment
at these stone features.”41 The cultural and religious significance
of the stone features, and detriment to the Tribes when
destroyed, has been described as follows:
The Tribe and the members of the Standing Rock have
direct ties to the stone features. Many have sacred
medicine bundles that are tied to these stone feature
sites. When these sites are adversely impacted, it
destroys the spiritual connection to these individuals. We
shall see the continued destruction of our spiritual places
if the court doesn’t intervene. This destruction greatly
harms the Tribe generally, and members of the Tribe like

37. See, e.g., Second Declaration of Dave Archambault II, Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.D.C. Feb. 9,
2017) [hereinafter Archambault Declaration of Feb. 9, 2017]; Archambault
Declaration of Aug. 3, 2016, supra note 25.
38. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶ 76; Mentz Declaration of
Sept. 2, 2016, supra note 30, ¶¶ 1–4.
39. Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶ 12.
40. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 35.
41. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
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myself.42
In addition, grave sites and burial grounds were located in
areas which would be disturbed by construction both during the
preparatory stages of construction on the ground surface and
once the pipeline was constructed below the ground.43 The Tribes
made submissions about the “high concentration of gravesites”44
along the path of the pipeline and highlighted the heightened
cultural and religious importance of the identified grave sites
and burial grounds which existed within the stone features45 and
included the graves of important chiefs to the Tribes.46
The Tribes considered that the proposed route of the
pipeline under burial sites near Lake Oahe would result in
“desecrat[ion]” of the graves “in much the same manner as
placing a pipeline under a formal cemetery,”47 and emphasized
that work preparing the ground for construction or to create
access pathways would destroy cultural burial grounds. For
example, legal and expert submissions warned of destruction to
cultural sites identified near Cannon Ball, North Dakota, and
sought injunctive relief, but grading was conducted by
construction crews in September 2016 resulting in the damage
and destruction of gravesites, as well as stone structures, cairns
and stone rings. Each of these sites, including some burial
grounds, were particularly vulnerable to damage and
destruction as they rested on the ground’s surface. The burial
grounds highlighted were traditionally placed near the surface
of the ground with rock cairns placed over them.48
The harm caused to the Tribe members affected the
individual’s cultural and religious beliefs and traditions. After
the destruction of the gravesites near Canon Ball, the Tribes set
out the importance of allowing the human remains to be
42. Id. ¶ 41.
43. See, e.g., Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 37.
44. Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24, ¶ 8; Mentz
Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 37 (“The DAPL is going right
through these areas we have already inventoried. Numerous burials were
encountered along with stone buffalo effigies, huge multiple stone ring
complexes and landscapes specific to buffalo spirit callers, a special spiritual
man within out spiritual walks of life.”).
45. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 16 (explaining that
stone structures are often the “final grave site” of an individual after the
individual dies).
46. Memorandum of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 28, at 3.
47. Archambault Declaration of Feb. 9, 2017, supra note 37, ¶ 16.
48. Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24, ¶ 8.
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reburied in order to “help deal with the loss and hurt of
disturbing these graves.”49 It was highlighted that the
destruction or damage to these sites is irreparable and with “no
‘fix’ in mitigation for these types of sites” because “[d]estruction
of these sites will eventually destroy generations of family
connections to these areas of spiritual power” and these sites
“are important to the survival and recovery of [the Tribes’]
spiritual traditions.”50 The emotional pain and long term
significance to the Tribe’s cultural preservation was further
highlighted with submissions with anecdotes such as:
My grandfather and great grandfather fought in war
with the U.S. Calvary in this valley and other enemy
tribes to defend these stone feature sites. The destruction
of these sites would be very personally painful to me and
is very harmful to the cultural survival of the Tribe. Once
lost they can never be restored.51
IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIONS FOR
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND HERITAGE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Since the late 1800s, international law has developed
protections for cultural property and heritage and created
accountability mechanisms to redress its destruction or damage.
It has been recognized that “the preservation of cultural heritage
is a growing international concern”52 and has become part of
customary international law. Although protections of cultural
property and heritage have “been reiterated repeatedly in
successive multilateral instruments” since the late 1800s,53
there is a clear progression in the scope of protection each
document covers.
Early documents recognizing the need for codified protection
focused on the protection of cultural property and the rights of

49. Id. ¶ 9.
50. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 19.
51. Id. ¶ 37.
52. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxII-Red2, Expert
Report- Reparations Phase, Dr. Marina Lostal, ¶ 23 (Aug. 11, 2017) [hereinafter
Al-Mahdi Reparations Order].
53. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, The Criminalisation of the International
Destruction of Cultural Heritage, in FORGING A SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (2016).
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the State where the property was located but failed to explicitly
use the term “heritage” to describe the protected sites. Some of
these documents included basic provisions on the prohibition
against plunder or pillage of property but went on to recognize
the protection of certain types of property which draw on the
concept of heritage, including institutions and buildings
dedicated to art, science, education or the religion of a society.
For example, the 1874 Brussels Declaration is said to be one
of the first international documents which set out a prohibition
on destroying cultural property during times of war following the
destruction of the cathedral and library in Strasbourg during the
Franco-Prussian War.54 Although the document was never
ratified,55 it demonstrates a move towards a consciousness on
what objects should be protected during times of war.56 The
document’s protections included the prohibition that a “town
taken by assault ought not to be given over to pillage by the
victorious troops,”57 but broadened the scope of its protections
and remedies in Article 8 of the document by prohibiting the
“seizure or destruction of, or wilful damage to, institutions
[dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences], historic monuments, works of art and science,” and
making any such acts “subject of legal proceedings by the
competent authorities.”58
This prohibition was further memorialized in the Hague
Convention of 1907 (the “Hague Regulations”) on the Laws and
Customs of Wars on Land. The Regulations, which were
“envisaged as protection of state sovereignty over the property
that was at stake”59 required that “all necessary steps must be
taken to spare” such cultural property as “buildings dedicated to
religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded
are collected.”60 Destruction of these sites was made subject to
54. Id.
55. Id.; Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A
Proposal for Defining New Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the ICC, 23 PENN
ST. INT’L L. REV. 857, 860 (2005).
56. Gottlieb, supra note 55, at 860.
57. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War art. 18, Aug. 27, 1874 (Brussels Declaration).
58. Id. art. 8.
59. BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND COMPARATIVE LAW, THE PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE IN CONFLICT 5 (2013) [hereinafter BIICL REPORT].
60. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on
Land art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631
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individual criminal responsibility in Article 56 which, in
language similar to the Declaration of Brussels, provided that
“seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
[dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences], historic monuments, works of art and science, is
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal
proceedings.”61
Following the Hague Regulations, later documents began to
conceptualize the protections granted as over the property itself,
and not the State where the property was located.62 However,
this understanding of what was the object of protection still only
covered cultural property, and not heritage, and only during
times of armed conflict.
This was the case with the Preliminary Peace Conference of
Paris in 1919 as well. As a result of cultural sites destroyed in
World War I such as churches and libraries, the Preliminary
Peace Conference of Paris in 1919 addressed similar protections
during armed conflict.63 The Conference created the Commission
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties “for the purpose of inquiring into the
responsibilities relating to the war.”64 The Commission’s report
presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference addressed issues
of individual criminal responsibility by including a list of war
crimes which included the crime of “wanton destruction of
religious, charitable, educational, and historic buildings and
monuments.”65
Perhaps the pinnacle of individual criminal responsibility to
this point, for acts of damage and destruction to cultural
property, came with the Nuremberg Charter and Tribunal.
Following World War II, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
further demonstrated the acceptance of adopting international
crimes for the destruction of cultural property during armed
conflict. Article 6(b) of the Charter reverted to the basic and
limited terminology of “plunder of public or private property” or
“wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages” when setting out

[hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].
61. Id. art. 56.
62. BIICL REPORT, supra note 59 (indicating that protection was over “the
cultural property as the object of protection”).
63. See M. Adatci, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 95 (1920).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 115.
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applicable war crimes for which the perpetrator can be held
individually responsible.66 However, in practice, Article 6(b) was
applied before the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in count three of the indictment, which listed war
crimes under Article 6, section E on “plunder of public and
private property”67 with the crime of plunder including the
destruction of property such as “cultural monuments” and
“scientific institutions.”68 The International Military Tribunal’s
Judgment also highlighted that the Tribunal considered a wide
range of properties which speak to the heritage of the cultural
property harmed. For example, among the accused, Alfred
Rosenberg was found individually responsible under this
provision for acts including the plunder of “museums and
libraries, confiscated art treasures and collections.”69
The Additional Protocols of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
provided further protection during armed conflicts of both an
international and non-international character with both
Protocol I and II prohibiting “acts of hostility directed against
the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.”70 State
acceptance of the Protocols is overwhelming with 174 States
ratifying Protocol I, and 169 States ratifying Protocol II.71
It wasn’t until 1954 that the object of protection in

66. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis and Charter of the International Military
Tribunal art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
67. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 55
(1947).
68. Id. at 55–56.
69. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 540
(1948) [hereinafter NUREMBERG JUDGMENT]; see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 228 (Mar. 3, 2000).
70. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art.
16, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts art. 53(a), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
71. See Treaties, State Parties, and Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORM
StatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (listing state
parties to Protocol I); Treaties, State Parties, and Commentaries, ICRC,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPag
es_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=475 (last visited Dec. 20, 2018)
(listing state parties to Protocol II).
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international instruments was extended to explicitly cover
cultural heritage in addition to cultural property, but also to
recognize the human link to these physical properties and
sites.72 To this, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict and its First
Protocol of 1954 and Second Protocol of 1999 are important to
the growing protection under international law for several
reasons. First, the Convention expanded the scope of protection
by using the term “heritage” as opposed to the texts of the past
which focused on the materialistic protection of only cultural
“property.”73 Next, the Second Protocol of 1999 established
individual criminal responsibility for violations of these
prohibitions.74 Last, the Convention and its Protocols specifically
recognized that sites guarded by the Convention are done so in
order to protect interests and rights of the people who value
these sites.75 Article 1(a) of the Convention makes both points
clear by defining cultural property as “movable or immovable
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every
people,”76 and the Protocols of 1954 and 1999 reference, and thus
support, this definition.77 Importantly, the Preamble of the
Convention further highlights both these points by stating that:
Being convinced that damage to cultural property
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the
cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people
makes its contribution to the culture of the world;
Considering that the preservation of the cultural

72. Corine Wegener, The 1954 Hague Convention and Preserving Cultural
Heritage, 1, ARCHAEOLOGICAL INST. AM. (Oct. 19, 2010), https://www.archaeo
logical.org/sites/default/files/files/Wegener%20v2.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 15–21. Mar. 26, 1999,
2253 U.N.T.S. 212, 218–20 [hereinafter Second Protocol]; see also ZUOZHEN LIU,
THE CASE FOR REPATRIATING CHINA’S CULTURAL OBJECTS 34 (2016).
75. Francesco Francioni, The Human Dimension of International Cultural
Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 13 (2011) (“It is interesting
to note that this statement speaks of ‘people’ and not states”).
76. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict art. 1(a), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 242 [hereinafter 1954
Hague Convention].
77. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter
First Protocol]; Second Protocol, supra note 74, art. 1(b).
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heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world
and that it is important that this heritage should receive
international protection.78
With adoption of the Hague Convention of 1954, there was
a clear recognition that the prohibition against the destruction
or damage of cultural property and heritage had gained the
status of customary international law.79 Widespread
international practice and acceptance of the protection of
cultural property led to this recognition, evidenced by the
extensive acceptance of the Additional Protocols of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and the Nuremberg Tribunal’s recognition
that the protections set out in the 1907 Hague Regulations “were
recognized by all civilized nations” and based on the general laws
and customs of war at the time.80
Commentary on the influence of the Hague Convention of
1954 recognizes it as the “paramount international
instrument”81 and notes that “consistent and unambiguous
practice”82 has resulted from “the basic principles . . . [which]
have become part of customary international law.”83
By the time of the adoption of the World Heritage
Convention in 1972, international protection focused on “the
protection of cultural heritage as a matter of public interest, and
not only as part of private property rights.”84 Its adoption by 193
State parties “reflected and channelled the pre-existing
international will” to protect cultural heritage85 and gave it a

78. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 76, pmbl.
79. See, e.g., 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 129, 131 (2005); LIU,
supra note 74, at 34; Francioni, supra note 75, at 11.
80. NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 69, at 253–54; Vrdoljak, supra note
53, at 3.
81. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflict, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 593, 593–94 (1999).
82. Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the
Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 635
(2003)..
83. Henckaerts, supra note 81, at 593–94; see also Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi,
ICC-01/12-01/15-214-Anx1-Red3, Brief by Ms. Karima Bennoune, 4 (Aug. 14,
2017) [hereinafter Al-Mahdi Report of Bennoune].
84. Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 82, at 635.
85. Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxII-Red2, Expert
Report—Reparations Phase, ¶ 33 (Aug. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Al-Mahdi Report
of Lostal]; see also Al-Mahdi Reparations Order, supra note 52, at ¶ 20 (adopting
Al-Mahdi Report of Lostal).
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“near-universal character.”86 The Convention recognized “that
parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding
interest” and that its protection was important to “the world
heritage of mankind as a whole.”87 The Convention called for
States to inventory sites of particular cultural heritage and
significance for protection through international cooperation,
but importantly stated that heritage sites not included within a
State’s inventory “shall in no way be construed to mean that it
does not have an outstanding universal value.”88 The Convention
also created a monitoring body, the World Heritage Committee,
designed to monitor application of the Convention and specific
sites at risk.89
What is particularly interesting about the World Heritage
Convention’s adoption was that it was motivated by events
which threatened cultural heritage outside of an armed conflict.
Until this time, no document had contemplated or addressed the
protection of cultural heritage (not just property) outside of an
armed conflict during times of peace. The Convention was in
response to the risk of damaging or destroying “ancient Nubian
monuments in the rock temples of Abu Simbel in Egypt” as a
result of the “construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile
in 1954” which would flood the cultural sites.90 Although the text
of the World Heritage Convention only speaks to protections
during an armed conflict and does not address protections in
times of peace, the document was inspired by a threat to cultural
heritage outside of an armed conflict (a construction project) and
recognizes that “the cultural heritage and the natural heritage
are increasingly threatened with destruction . . . by changing
social and economic conditions.”91 The major international
instruments on cultural property and heritage protection had
focused on protections during armed conflicts, but the events
which inspired the Convention’s adoption, in effect are a nod to
the direction in which protection is developing.
In 2003, UNESCO adopted the Declaration Concerning the
International Destruction of Cultural Heritage, which is held as

86. Francioni, supra note 75, at 11.
87. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, pmbl, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World
Heritage Convention].
88. Id. art. 12.
89. Id. art. 8–13.
90. Al-Mahdi Report of Lostal, supra note 85, ¶ 33.
91. World Heritage Convention, supra note 87, pmbl.
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“evidence of customary international law.”92 Importantly, the
UNESCO Declaration recognized the gap between protection of
cultural heritage and property during armed conflict versus
times of peace, and that the development of customary
international law is developing towards closing this gap.93 The
Declaration notes the “development of rules of customary
international law . . . related to the protection of cultural
heritage in peacetime as well as in the event of armed conflict”
and creates a duty for States to “take all appropriate measures
to conduct them in such a manner as to protect cultural heritage”
during peacetime activities.94
The development of international protections through these
instruments and documents clearly supports a conclusion that
the protection of both cultural property and heritage during
armed conflict is part of customary international law. In
practice, this is demonstrated through the reliance of the UN
Security Council and General Assembly on these norms. For
example, on July 5, 2012, the UN Security Council condemned
the “desecration, damage and destruction of sites of holy, historic
and cultural significance” in Mali in Resolution 2056,95 and on
February 22, 2014, called on States to protect Syria’s “rich
societal mosaic and cultural heritage” and World Heritage Sites
in Resolution 2139.96 In Resolution 2199, the Security Council
condemned “the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and
Syria.”97 Similarly, UN General Assembly 69/281 stressed the
importance of cultural heritage in response to destruction of
cultural heritage in Iraq carried out by the Islamic State by
noting that “the destruction of cultural heritage, which is
representative of the diversity of human culture, erases the
collective memories of a nation, destabilizes communities and
threatens their cultural identity,” and affirmed that attacks
“amount to war crimes.”98 However, like the Resolutions from
the UN Security Council, the General Assembly only addressed
92. Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime
Against Property or a Crime Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 336, 383 (2016).
93. UNESCO, 32 C/Res. 33 Annex, Declaration Concerning the
International Destruction of Cultural Heritage, pmbl (Oct. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 UNESCO Declaration].
94. Id. pt. IV.
95. S.C. Res. 2056, pmbl (July 5, 2012).
96. S.C. Res. 2139, pmbl (Feb. 22, 2014).
97. S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 15 (Feb. 12, 2015).
98. G.A. Res. 69/281, pmbl, ¶ 5 (May 28, 2015).
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the destruction in the context of an armed conflict and only
noting war crimes as a criminal remedy; leaving protection of
cultural heritage during peace time unaddressed.
Most notably, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
2347 on March 24, 2017, which addressed the importance of the
protection of cultural property.99 In regards to accountability,
the Resolution affirmed “that directing unlawful attacks against
sites and buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science
or charitable purposes, or historic monuments may constitute,
under certain circumstances and pursuant to international law
a war crime and that perpetrators of such attacks must be
brought to justice,” and while recognizing the ICC’s decision
convicting Al-Mahdi of war crimes for attacks in Mali.100 Again,
the Resolution failed to recognize the importance of protecting
cultural heritage during times of peace, and only emphasized the
“unlawful destruction of cultural heritage, and the looting and
smuggling of cultural property in the event of armed
conflicts . . . .”101
Unlike the international norms protecting cultural property
and heritage during armed conflict, “the protection of cultural
[heritage and] property during peacetime is more ambiguous.”102
Thus, peace-time protection of cultural heritage and property
can be more accurately said to be in the process of ‘developing’
towards the status of customary international law, as evidenced
by the 2003 UNESCO Declaration.103 Scholarly writing has
noted that it would be “far fetched to conclude that no legal
protection is given to cultural property in peacetime[,]” but found
that it is hard to conclude that an international norm rising to
the level of customary international law has been established.104
Nevertheless, the adoption of several instruments recognizing
the importance of protecting sites of cultural heritage during
times of peace is a step toward making this principle an
international norm.
In addition to the 2003 UNESCO Declaration, several
international documents mentioned protections during both
times of war and peace, but as they pre-dated the trend toward
protecting both property and heritage, only focused on property
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

S.C. Res. 2347 (Mar. 24, 2017).
Id. ¶ 3–4.
Id. ¶ 1.
Gottlieb, supra note 55, at 872.
See 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 93, pt. IV.
Gottlieb, supra note 55, at 872.
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as the object of protection. These documents included the
American Roerich Pact of 1935—signed by 11 States in South
and Central America—which provided that the “same respect
and protection shall be accorded to the historic monuments,
museums, scientific, artistic, educational and cultural
institutions in time of peace as well as in war.”105 Likewise,
protection of cultural property against illicit import, export and
transfer of ownership, without mention of whether the
protection covered the property during times of peace or war,
was laid out in the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property.106
The protection of both cultural heritage and property during
times of peace had formerly been recognized by UNESCO in its
Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural
Property Endangered by Public or Private Works of 1968.107 In
recognizing the importance of cultural heritage to mankind, the
Recommendation emphasized that protection “extend[ing] to the
whole territory of the State” and not just to “certain monuments
and sites”108 and must be aimed at activities which take place
during times of peace, including the “construction of pipelines
and of power and transmission lines of electricity[.]”109
More recently, the Convention for the Safeguarding of
Intangible Cultural Heritage was adopted by the UNESCO
General Conference in 2003 and entered into force in 2006.110
Not only did the Convention recognize that “no binding
multilateral instrument as yet exists for the safeguarding of the
intangible cultural heritage,”111 but it also provided protection
during peacetime for the “practices, representations,
105. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and
Historic Monuments art. 1, Apr. 15, 1935, 167 L.N.T.S. 289.
106. See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970,
823 U.N.T.S. 231.
107. See UNESCO, 15 C/Res., Recommendation Concerning the
Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works (Nov.
19, 1968).
108. Id. ¶ 3.
109. Id. ¶ 8(f).
110. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage,
Oct. 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter ICH Convention]; The States
Parties to the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural
Heritage (2003), UNESCO, https://ich.unesco.org/en/states-parties-00024 (last
updated Nov. 5, 2018).
111. ICH Convention, supra note 110, pmbl.
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expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the instruments,
objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith”
which it considered to be intangible cultural heritage.112 In
addition, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, also
provides protection for cultural heritage during times of
peace.113 Article 31 of the Declaration sets out the right of
indigenous peoples “to maintain, control, protect and develop
their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions” and “to maintain, control, protect and
develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage,
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.”114
It has also been argued that the Declaration’s “raison d’etre is
the preservation and development of the cultural identity of
indigenous peoples . . . .”115
Therefore, while it is difficult to conclude that an
international norm rising to the level of customary international
law has been established which protects international property
and heritage during times of peace, the existence of a number of
international instruments addressing protection during
peacetime demonstrates a clear development in that direction.
This development could lead to a norm under customary
international law recognizing that cultural heritage and
property are threatened not only during an armed conflict, but
that the everyday economic and social activities of a society
during peacetime could also put these sites at risk.
It must be noted that the recognition of such a norm is
unnecessary to support criminal action when an act specifically
violates an existing instrument which sets out individual
criminal responsibility for violations of its protections, such as
the Second Protocol of 1999 to the Hague Convention.116 Instead,
establishing a customary international law norm over the
protection of cultural heritage during peacetime would assist
with reaching the conclusion that an attack on cultural heritage
during peacetime constitutes a deprivation of a group’s
fundamental human rights contrary to international law, and
thus, an act grave enough to rise to the level of a crime of
112. ICH Convention, supra note 110, art. 2(1).
113. G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples (Sept.
13, 2007).
114. Id. art. 31.
115. Francioni, supra note 75, at 15.
116. See Second Protocol, supra note 74.
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persecution, as discussed in more detail below.117
V. DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AS A
WAR CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, AND THE ICC’S AL-MAHDI
PROSECUTION
Although international instruments on the protection of
cultural property and heritage can be said to be developing
toward a consensus of protections during peacetime as well as
during armed conflict, the legal texts and case law of
international criminal tribunals have solely applied to instances
of destruction of cultural property and heritage during armed
conflicts.
The legal texts of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stand out as allowing for
prosecutions when cultural heritage is destroyed; although, only
as a war crime when committed during an armed conflict. The
ECCC adopted the destruction of cultural property as a crime
under its jurisdiction.118 Based on a reading of the 1954 Hague
Convention, which found that “damage to cultural property
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the
cultural heritage of all mankind”, the ECCC’s Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers grants, in Article
7, “the power to bring to trial all Suspects most responsible for
the destruction of cultural property during armed
conflict . . . .”119 The ICTY codified the protection of cultural
property under international humanitarian law as a crime
under Article 3 of its statute.120 Article 3 sets out violations of
the laws and customs of war with section (d) giving the Tribunal
the power to prosecute individuals violating the prohibition
against “seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts
and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and

117. Infra pp. 187–209.
118. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period
of Democratic Kampuchea art. 7 (2001), amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct.
27, 2004) (unofficial translation) (Cambodia) [hereinafter ECCC Statute].
119. Id.
120. S.C. Res. 827, art. 3(d), Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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science . . . .”121
This is in comparison to the statutes establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) which give each body the
power to prosecute persons for attacks against cultural property,
but in the limited scope of only recognizing acts of pillage
committed during an armed conflict as violations.122 The
Statutes of the ICTR and SCSL allow for the acts of pillage in
violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II to be investigated and prosecuted as war
crimes.123
While this article concludes that the destruction of cultural
heritage and property occurring during peacetime may be
addressed by the ICC as a crime against humanity, the ICC’s
Statute is similar to the legal texts of the ICTY, ECCC, ICTR
and SCSL which only allow prosecutions for attacks on cultural
property (i.e. providing protection for cultural heritage) during
times of war.124 With language mirroring the protections granted
to cultural property under Article 27 of the Hague Convention of
1907,125 Article 8(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute provides that
“serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international charter” include “[i]ntentionally
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded
are collected.”126
In addition, the case law of the ICC has only recently
addressed the protection of cultural heritage. The case against
Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome
Statute marked the first time the ICC had brought charges for
the destruction of cultural heritage under any provision of the
121. Id.
122. S.C. Res. 1315, art. 3(f), Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(Aug. 14, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, art. 4(f), Statute of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
123. SCSL Statute, supra note 122; ICTR Statute, supra note 122; Micaela
Frulli, The Criminalization of Offences Against Cultural Heritage in Times of
Armed Conflict: The Quest for Consistency, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 203, 206 n.10
(2011).
124. See ECCC Statute, supra note 118; SCSL Statute, supra note 122; Rome
Statute, supra note 10, art. 8; ICTR Statute, supra note 122; ICTY Statute,
supra note 120.
125. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 60, art. 27.
126. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8.
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Rome Statute, and in this case only as a war crime. While
initiation of this case indicates a recognition by the ICC of the
importance of crimes committed against cultural heritage, it
gives no indication that it will consider the destruction of
cultural heritage as a crime against humanity of persecution
under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
In the case against Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, the ICC PreTrial Chamber issued an arrest warrant on September 18, 2015,
accusing Al Mahdi of being individually criminally responsible
for the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against
historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion,
including nine mausoleums and one mosque in Timbuktu during
an armed conflict not of an international character.127 The trial
was quickly resolved when Al-Mahdi made an admission of guilt
on August 22, 2016,128 and as a result the Trial Chamber issued
a judgment on September 27, 2016 deciding that “the Chamber
is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all the essential facts
of the crime charged are proven” and as a result “convicts Mr. Al
Mahdi as a co-perpetrator for attacking . . . protected objects in
Timbuktu, Mali” pursuant to Articles 8(2)(e)(iv), 25(3)(a) and
65(2) of the Rome Statute.129
During the preliminary examination phase of the Situation
in Mali, reports from the Office of the Prosecutor in 2012 and
2013 indicated that the Prosecution was examining and
investigating the alleged acts as war crimes, while noting that
“the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to
believe that crimes against humanity under Article 7 have been
committed in the Situation in Mali.”130 The Prosecution’s report
at the initiation of its formal investigation stated that its
assessment on applicable crimes against humanity “may be
revisited in the future,”131 but the Court proceeded with issuing
an arrest warrant on the basis of war crimes only.132 The
decision of the Prosecution not to investigate or prosecute the
attacks against cultural heritage—bearing some similarities to
127. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15-1-Red, Mandat
d’arrêt à l’encontre d’Ahmad AL FAQI AL MAHDI (Sept. 18, 2015) [hereinafter
Al-Mahdi Arrest Warrant].
128. Al-Mahdi Judgment, supra note 7, ¶¶ 7, 98–100.
129. Id. ¶¶ 62–63.
130. Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 14, ¶¶ 8, 128; ICC, Office of the
Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, ¶ 181 (Nov.
2012).
131. Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 14, ¶ 128.
132. Al-Mahdi Arrest Warrant, supra note 127, ¶¶ 3, 8.
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the sites of cultural heritage damaged and destroyed during
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline—as a crime against
humanity in the case of Mali, should not speak to the prospect of
the ICC applying Article 7 to other incidents where cultural
heritage is attacked during times of peace.
The Trial Chamber’s strong findings in its recent Judgment
and Reparations decisions on the importance of cultural heritage
and “special protection of cultural property in international
law”133 indicate the ICC’s willingness to view the protection of
cultural heritage with a broad scope. The Trial Chamber’s recent
Reparations Order of October 17, 2017, drew significant
parallels to the ways that destroying a community’s cultural
heritage deprives the population of its fundamental rights. For
example, the Trial Chamber observed the “importance of the
human right to cultural life and its physical embodiments” and
that destruction of cultural heritage would violate this right by
“depriv[ing] a community of its identity and memory, as well as
the physical testimony of its past.”134 The Trial Chamber
recognized that criminalizing its damage and destruction is not
just about protecting property, but also about the individuals
and communities affected; stating that “[c]ultural heritage is
important not only in itself, but also in relation to its human
dimension.”135
Recognition of the human element when cultural heritage is
attacked is critical to finding that crimes against humanity,
under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, are applicable to the events
concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, and any other events
involving the destruction of cultural heritage in times of
peace.136 This is because a crime against humanity is ultimately
a crime about harm committed against humans, as noted in
Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which plainly requires that a
crime against humanity must be “directed against [a] civilian
population.”137 For the underlying crime of persecution, the
deprivation of a fundamental right must have been committed
in a “collective nature” against a population or group of the

133. Al-Mahdi Judgment, supra note 7, ¶¶ 13–14.
134. Al-Mahdi Reparations Order, supra note 52, ¶ 14.
135. Id. ¶ 16.
136. Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 36–37 (2001).
137. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7.
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people.138
The case law of the ICTY demonstrates that the destruction
of cultural property can be viewed as a crime against humans
which violates their fundamental human rights and creates a
precedent for the ICC to similarly apply Article 7 to allegations
of attacks on cultural heritage.

VI.

DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AS A
CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY BEFORE THE
ICTY

The destruction of cultural heritage has been recognised as
a punishable offence not only as a war crime but also as a crime
against humanity of persecution under international criminal
law.139 Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, a series of cases has supported the
conclusion that the destruction of cultural property is an act of
persecution and has issued convictions on the crime against
humanity of persecution based on attacks against property and
sites which held cultural importance.
In finding that acts of destruction of cultural heritage
amount to the crime against humanity of persecution, several
cases explicitly noted the human link between the act of
destroying or damaging cultural heritage and the fundamental
right of the individuals affected which elevates the acts to the
crime of persecution as a crime against humanity. In the Blaskic
case, the ICTY Trial Chamber identified the human element
associated with the destruction of cultural heritage, which is
required to constitute the denial of a fundamental right rising to
the level of persecution as a crime against humanity. The Trial
Chamber stated that “persecution may take forms other than
injury to the human person, in particular those acts rendered
serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the discrimination
they seek to instil [sic] within humankind.”140 The Chamber
expanded the scope of what harm demonstrates persecution,
stating that the crime of persecution “encompasses not only
bodily and mental harm and infringements upon individual

138. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶
644, 697 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
139. See Gerstenblith, supra note 92, at 390.
140. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 69, ¶ 227.
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freedom but also acts which appear less serious, such as those
targeting property, so long as the victimised persons were
specially selected on grounds linked to their belonging to a
particular community.”141
Similarly, in the Krajisnik case, the Trial Chamber
recognised that attacks on cultural property affect the rights of
a person and have “a severe impact on persons who value that
property.”142 On this basis the Trial Chamber confirmed that the
destruction of cultural property is “an underlying act of
persecution” and includes the “destruction or damage of an
institution dedicated to religion, charity, education, or the arts
and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science,
when the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy or damage
that property or in the reckless disregard of the substantial
likelihood of the destruction or damage.”143
In Kordić and Čerkez, the Trial Chamber recognised that
attacks on cultural heritage of a religious nature “may amount
to an act of persecution” because it is an attack “on the very
religious identity of a people.”144 In addition, it found a wider
effect than the immediate individuals harmed, as “all of
humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique
religious culture and its concomitant cultural objects;”145 a
conclusion which supported its finding that the act of
persecution was a crime against humanity. This conclusion was
reinforced in Jokic, which found that the destruction of historical
locations, such as the Old Town of Dubrovnik, “was an attack
not only against the history and heritage of the region, but also
against the cultural heritage of humankind.”146 In addition to
the above, the cases against Naletilic and Martinovic,147 Prlić,148

141. Id.¶ 233.
142. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 781 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006).
143. Id. ¶ 782.
144. Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 207
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001).
145. Id.
146. Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶
51, 53 ((Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004).
147. See Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 704,
709, 713, 763 ((Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003).
148. See Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment, Vol. 3 of 6, 22–
23, ¶ 178 ((Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013).
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Brdanin149 and Milutinović150 found that the crime against
humanity of persecution was committed by the “destruction or
wilful damage done to institutions” of cultural significance to
individuals and communities including those “dedicated to
religion.”151
Although the factual background of each of these cases
before the ICTY involved crimes committed during the course of
an armed conflict, a clear precedent was set that the destruction
of cultural heritage can be applied under international criminal
law as a crime against humanity; opening the door for this crime
against humanity to be applied to crimes committed during
times of peace.
The ICTY’s case law is important to advancing the
application of Article 7 of the Rome Statute to instances of
cultural heritage destruction. However, each ICTY case
charging a crime against humanity of persecution for the
destruction of cultural heritage concerns allegations of
destruction or damage which took place during an armed
conflict. This reality can be attributed to the jurisdictional limit
the Statute of the ICTY placed over crimes against humanity.
Article 5 of the Statute concerns “crimes when committed in
armed conflict, whether international or internal in
character.”152 The ICTY’s inclusion of a ‘war nexus’ as a
jurisdictional limit over the definition of crimes against
humanity originates in the formulation of crimes against
humanity in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
(the Nuremberg Tribunal) in order to rationalize international
jurisdiction over these crimes and not with the intention of
limiting the definition or scope of the crimes.153
149. See Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 15(c),
1082 ((Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004).
150. See Prosecutor v. Milutinović, et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶
206 ((Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009).
151. Prosecutor v. Prlić, supra note 148, ¶ 178.
152. ICTY Statute, supra note 120, art. 5.
153. See Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and
the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 85 (1994) (opining
that although the Nuremberg Tribunal “did not consider crimes committed
before the war to be crimes against humanity, it may have been guided by
jurisdictional considerations and not necessarily by a conceptually narrow
definition of crimes against humanity.”); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of
Crimes against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 787, 791 (1998) (“[T]he Charter of the International Military Tribunal
contained a curious limiting principle: the Nuremberg Tribunal could assert
jurisdiction only over those crimes against humanity committed ‘before or
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Following the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ‘war nexus’ was
applied to crimes against humanity as a substantive element by
“international tribunals, international law drafters and
commentators in the post-Nuremberg era [which] were left to
follow the Nuremberg precedent in their treatment of the
prohibition against crimes against humanity.”154 As noted above,
this included the Statute of the ICTY, but it is notable that the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY made clear that the ‘war nexus’
was merely a jurisdictional limit and not a substantive element
of the crime.155
Although there is no precedent to date under international
criminal law where the crime against humanity of persecution
has been applied to events occurring during times of peace, the
provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC on crimes against
humanity contain no jurisdictional limits which require a ‘war
nexus.’156
Therefore, this article will examine the requirements under
Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute for establishing a crime
against humanity of persecution with regard to the events
concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, as well as the
destruction of cultural heritage more generally during times of
peace.
VII.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME AGAINST
HUMANITY OF PERSECUTION, AND THE
DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE

As demonstrated in the case law of the ICTY, the
destruction of cultural heritage has been recognised not only as
a war crime but also as a crime against humanity of
persecution.157 However, the jurisdictional limits of the Tribunal
during the war’ and ‘in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal,’ i.e., war crimes or crimes against the peace. This
formulation became known as the ‘war nexus,’ and it is apparent that the
Charter’s drafters and the Nuremberg Tribunal itself considered the war nexus
necessary to justify the extension of international jurisdiction into what would
otherwise be acts within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.”).
154. Van Schaack, supra note 153, at 792.
155. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 73–78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Van Schaack, supra note 153, at 794.
156. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7; Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes
against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L., 43, 45–46 (1999).
157. See § VI, pp. 183–86 supra.
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and the “war nexus” requirement for crimes against humanity
mean that the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity
cannot be applied to events occurring during times of peace.
Therefore, to analyze the applicability of this crime during times
of peace, the provisions of the Rome Statute on crimes against
humanity, which were drafted to eliminate jurisdictional limits
involving the war nexus requirement, must be examined.
The Rome Statute sets out in Article 7 that a crime against
humanity means any of the underlying acts listed in Article 7(1)
“when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack.”158 Among the underlying acts listed in Article 7, is the
act of persecution under Article 7(1)(h). In order to allege that
the destruction of cultural property and heritage is a crime
against humanity of persecution, the Rome Statute requires that
the contextual elements of a crime against humanity are proven
as well as the elements of the underlying act of persecution. In
addition, the case law of the ICTY requires an examination of
the actus reus and mens rea of the underlying act of destruction
of cultural heritage.159
For this analysis, the requirements for the underlying crime
of persecution, along with the actus reus and mens rea for its
underlying act of destruction of cultural heritage, will be
examined considering the events surrounding the Dakota Access
Pipeline, ending with a review of the contextual elements
necessary for proving a crime against humanity. In
acknowledging that there are allegations of destruction and
damage of cultural heritage in many other locations along the
pipeline affecting many Native American Tribes, this article will
focus on the allegations made by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
as well as the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe concerning the sites
and objects of cultural and religious heritage which were
damaged and destroyed near Cannon Ball, North Dakota.
A. THE UNDERLYING CRIME OF PERSECUTION
Article 7(1)(h) establishes the act of “persecution against
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or other grounds that are

158. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7.
159. Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 206 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009).
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universally recognized as impermissible under international
law” as an underlying crime to an Article 7 crime against
humanity, and specifies that it must be committed “in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”160 Article 7(2)(g) goes
on to define persecution as “the intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law
by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”161
The ICC’s document “Elements of Crimes” sets out the
required elements for the “crime against humanity of
persecution”.162 As the fifth and sixth element listed in the
document relate to the contextual elements for crimes against
humanity, it is the first four elements listed in the Elements of
Crimes which set out the elements for the crime of
persecution.163 The Elements of Crimes requires the following
four elements for an act to constitute a crime against humanity
of persecution under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute:
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to
international law, one or more persons of fundamental
rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by
reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted
the group or collectivity as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in article 7,
paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under
international law.
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act
referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.164

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(h).
Id. art. 7(2)(g).
ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 18, art. 7(1)(h).
Id.
Id.
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1. The underlying conduct of destroying or damaging
cultural heritage and property
It is notable that the Rome Statute nowhere mentions that
the crime of persecution includes the act of destroying cultural
heritage or property.165 By contrast, the case law of the ICTY
found that the act of destruction itself must first be established;
that in order to address acts of destruction of cultural heritage
as a crime against humanity of persecution, “the actus reus and
mens rea” must be established for the underlying act of “wanton
destruction or damage of religious sites and cultural
monuments, as a form of persecution, a crime against
humanity.”166
The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Milutinović case set out the
requirements for establishing the actus reus for the underlying
offence of destruction of cultural property and heritage as
follows: “(a) the religious or cultural property must be destroyed
or damaged extensively; (b) the religious or cultural property
must not be used for a military purpose at the time of the act;
and (c) the destruction or damage must be the result of an act
directed against this property.”167
In setting out these actus reus elements, the Trial Chamber
in Milutinović further defined the terms “destruction” and
“damage.” While both “destruction” and “damage” “must be
extensive,” the term destruction “signifie[s] demolition or
reduction to a useless form,” and the term damage “refers to
physical injury or harm to an object that impairs its usefulness
or value.”168
These definitions assist with analysing the first element in
Milutinović for the underlying offence of destruction of cultural
property and heritage. The Milutinović court noted how these
sites were extensively destroyed and damaged, such that they
were rendered useless, and that they had lost their cultural
value169 due to the grading conducted by construction crews in
order to make an access road to the pipeline.170 Expert testimony
165. Sebastián Green Martínez, Destruction of Cultural Heritage in North
Mali: A Crime Against Humanity?, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1073, 1079 (2015).
166. Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 206 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009).
167. Id.
168. Id. ¶ 207.
169. Id. ¶ 20.
170. See, e.g., Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24.
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set out the extent of the damages which construction companies
caused to these sites due to the fact that most were located at or
near the surface of the ground, and would therefore be critically
affected by grading of the ground’s surface. The culturallysignificant stone structures and cairns identified and then
damaged and destroyed, were located on the ground’s surface,
and were therefore destroyed by the construction work on
September 3, 2016.171 The location also had a high concentration
of grave sites to the Tribes’ ancestors and of important chiefs,
many of which were located at or near the surface, with cairns
placed on top of the graves. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
highlighted the extent of construction crews’ damage to these
culturally-significant burial sites by petitioning to halt all
construction in the days following the grading process, so that
they could collect and rebury the human remains which the
crews had displaced and scattered.172 Testimony from Tribe
members and cultural experts noted that the damage was
extensive enough to be described as “irreparable.”173
As to the second element on whether the property had the
status of a civilian versus a military object, the ICTY’s
jurisdictional limitation requiring a ‘war nexus’ for crimes
against humanity comes to mind,174 as well as the importance
under international humanitarian law principles of ascertaining
the legality of an attack based on a target’s status as a military
object.175 Given that the nexus to an armed conflict is not
required before the ICC, and analysis at issue under Article 7 is
for an event taking place in times of peace, it is unclear how the
ICC would consider this element under Milutinović.
Nevertheless, it is clear in the case of destruction of cultural
heritage near Cannon Ball, North Dakota that the cultural and
religious objects destroyed were not military objects, nor were
they used for any military purpose.
Last, the cultural heritage and property located in the area
near Canon Ball, North Dakota and along the path of the
pipeline were the ancestral “gravesites and culturally important
stone features,” such as stone structures, effigies and cairns “in
and adjacent to the right of way” of the pipeline, all of which

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 19.
Van Schaack, supra note 153, at 792.
See, e.g., First Protocol, supra note 77, art. 52.
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were destroyed on September 3, 2016.176 Given the notification
of the presence of objects of cultural heritage before the area was
graded for construction,177 it can be argued those responsible for
construction on the land had notice that grading the land would
destroy these objects. With this knowledge, it can be said that
the actions of construction were an “act directed against” the
cultural property and heritage of the Tribes.
Therefore, I argue that the act of destroying or damaging
cultural heritage or property, as underlying conduct to the crime
against humanity of persecution, in the case of the cultural
heritage and property near Cannon Ball, is present. The
construction companies took actions directed against the land,
which they knew would damage objects of cultural heritage that
were not military objects. Further, the crews did in fact destroy
or damage these sites and objects to an irreparable state which
impaired their cultural and religious value.
2. The intent to destroy or damage cultural heritage and
property
As for the required mens rea at the ICC for the act of
destroying cultural heritage and property, Article 30 of the Rome
Statute sets out that “a person shall be criminally responsible
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court only if the material elements are committed with
intent and knowledge.”178 Article 30 defines ‘intent’ as
“mean[ing] to engage in the conduct” and being aware that the
consequence “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”179
While ‘knowledge’ is defined as “awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events.”180
It is notable that for the ICC’s first case considering the war
crime of destruction of cultural heritage under Article 8(2)(e)(iv),
the Trial Chamber found that the “specific intent of the
defendant to attack protected objects” was the required mens rea
for Article 8(2)(e)(iv).181 For the purpose of holding attacks on
176. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶¶ 76, 78; see also, e.g.,
Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24.
177. See, e.g., Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶ 12.
178. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(1).
179. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(2).
180. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(3).
181. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15-171, Judgment and
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cultural heritage as a crime against humanity of persecution
under Article 7(1)(h), the requirements of Article 30, and the
mens rea requirement for destruction of property in Al-Mahdi
are informative. For the crime against humanity of persecution,
a “high threshold of intention” is required to show “intentional
and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to
international law.”182
Further, the case law of the ICTY provides guidance on the
required actus reus for destruction or damage to cultural
heritage or property as a crime against humanity.183
Jurisprudence from the Milutinović and Krajisnik cases apply a
standard which broadly holds individuals responsible not only if
their actions are committed with the specific intent to deprive a
group or collectivity of fundamental rights, but also if the
perpetrator’s actions are committed with knowledge that the
actions would cause harm and were taken, nevertheless, with
reckless disregard.184 The Trial Chambers in the Milutinović and
Krajisnik cases explained that the “mens rea required for the
offence is that the physical perpetrator, intermediary
perpetrator, or accused acted with the intent to destroy or
extensively damage the property in question, or in reckless
disregard of the likelihood of its destruction or damage.”185
Commentary on the ‘intentionality element’ of the
destruction of cultural heritage has noted that, under the Rome
Statute, this element “needs to be understood in light of a
standard of reckless disregard or willful negligence for the
consequences of an attack that is likely to cause collateral
damage to cultural heritage.”186 Likewise, the UNESCO
Declaration of 2003 also supports the proposition that the intent
Sentence, ¶ 12 (Sept. 27, 2016).
182. Valerie Oosterveld, Gender, Persecution, and the International
Criminal Court: Refugee Law’s Relevance to the Crime Against Humanity of
Gender-Based Persecution, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 49, 57 (2006).
183. Id. at 59.
184. See Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 14, ¶ 127 (establishing that
for a crime against humanity, the contextual elements which must be proven
include “(v) the accused’s knowledge of the attack”).
185. Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 206 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009); Prosecutor v. Krajisnik,
Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 782 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006) (finding the destruction of cultural property is “[A]n
underlying act of persecution . . . when the perpetrator acted with the intent to
destroy or damage that property or in the reckless disregard of the substantial
likelihood of the destruction or damage.”).
186. Gerstenblith, supra note 92, at 390.
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requirement should consider both specific intent and reckless
disregard on the part of the perpetrator.187 Although the
UNESCO Declaration addresses the standard of intent for
States which are responsible for acts of destruction, and not the
standard on the level of individual criminal responsibility, it
provides that a State which “intentionally destroys or
intentionally fails to take appropriate measures to prohibit,
prevent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction of cultural
heritage of great importance for humanity . . . bears the
responsibility for such destruction.”188 This is further supported
by UN Security Council Resolution 2199, which addresses both
the “incidental or deliberate” destruction of cultural property.189
In the case of the pipeline, those responsible for construction
of the pipeline had been notified of the presence of the cultural
heritage on the areas meant for construction, and of the
likelihood that construction would irreparably damage and
destroy these sites, through legal submissions and expert
declarations which documented that ancestral graves, stone
rings, cairns, effigies and other culturally significant sites were
either in the direct path of the pipeline, or in close vicinity.190
The submissions and evidence specifically noted that
“[c]onstruction of the pipeline, which includes clearing and
grading a 100–150 foot access pathway nearly 1200 miles long,
digging a trench as deep as 10 feet, and building and burying the
pipeline, would destroy burial grounds, sacred sites, and
historically significant areas on either side of Lake Oahe.”191 The
cultural and religious significance of these sites to the Tribes
was also made clear.192 It was submitted that construction would
“without a doubt” destroy these historical and cultural sites.193
Despite the legal and expert submissions submitted and
efforts for injunctive relief warning of the sites’ vulnerability to
damage and destruction due to their location at or near the
ground’s surface, construction crews commenced grading
operations in September 2016, resulting in the damage and
destruction of gravesites, as well as stone structures, cairns and

187. 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 93, pt. VI.
188. Id.
189. S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 97, ¶ 15.
190. Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶ 12.
191. Complaint of July 27, 2016, supra note 26, ¶ 76; Mentz Declaration of
Sept. 2, 2016, supra note 30, ¶¶ 1–4.
192. Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶ 12.
193. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 35.
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stone rings. The fact that the corporations involved with
construction proceeded despite notification through legal
proceedings of the presence of cultural heritage on the locations
of potential construction, demonstrates an intent to take action
with knowledge of the likelihood that the actions would result in
the destruction and damage of these sites. It could be asserted
that those responsible for the construction of the pipeline
specifically intended to destroy the cultural heritage by moving
forward with construction on the site, but a more likely
argument is that these actions were taken with full knowledge,
and reckless disregard, of the consequences of the actions.
Therefore, I argue that the required mens rea, which would be
applied to the crime against humanity of persecution for
destroying cultural heritage, has been met.
3. The group or collectivity was targeted based on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or
other grounds.
Carrying on from the analysis of intent, the Elements of
Crimes requires that an act of persecution demonstrate that the
group or collectivity whose cultural heritage was destroyed was
targeted on the basis of political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender or other grounds.194 In addition to
establishing that the group attacked belongs to a group with a
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender
identity, courts also link this consideration to the issue of intent,
as the element calls for evidence that the population was
targeted based on a number of grounds relating to the identity
of the group. In essence, it is asking for a showing that the attack
was driven by an intention based on the identity of the group.
In the events concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline, the
identity of the “group or collectivity” attacked is clear. The
cultural heritage destroyed was significant to the people of the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, in particular, and also to the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. The sites of cultural heritage
damaged and destroyed near Canon Ball, North Dakota on
September 3, 2016 were located just north of the Standing Rock
reservation,195 and the reservation is home to about half of the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s members; meaning that about
194. ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 18, art. 7(1)(h).
195. Mentz Declaration of Sept. 2, 2016, supra note 30, ¶ 12.
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9,000 members of the Tribe live on the reservation and look to
these sites in and around the reservation as part of their culture,
religion, and heritage.196
As for the issue of the perpetrator’s intent to target a “group
or collectivity,” case law before the ICTY has established that
the crime of persecution “requires evidence of a specific intent to
discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds and that it
falls to the Prosecution to prove that the relevant acts were
committed with the requisite discriminatory intent.”197 The
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Dordevic confirmed that although the
“requisite discriminatory intent cannot be inferred directly from
the general discriminatory nature of an attack characterised as
a crime against humanity, however, it ‘may be inferred from
such a context of the attack so long as, in view of the facts of the
case, circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged
acts substantiate the existence of such intent.’”198 The Appeals
Chamber clarified that circumstances which may be taken into
consideration include “the general attitude of the alleged
perpetrator of the offence as seen through his or her
behaviour.”199 The Appeals Chamber also noted that the
perpetrator’s “personal motive does not preclude a perpetrator
from also having the requisite specific intent,” explaining that
the perpetrator might have a separate motivation for the action,
“but at the same time also possess the intent to discriminate
against his or her victim on political, racial, or religious
grounds.”200
The fact that the ICTY found that “[i]t is not sufficient for
the accused to be aware that he or she is in fact acting in a way
that is discriminatory,”201 but that the perpetrator must
“consciously intend to discriminate,”202 is a hurdle to overcome
in proving that the destruction of cultural heritage as a result of
the pipeline’s construction is an act of persecution. What is
196. Archambault Declaration of Aug. 3, 2016, supra note 25, ¶ 2.
197. Prosecutor v. Dordević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 876 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 27, 2014) (quoting Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003)).
198. Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Dordević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 1759–60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 23, 2011)).
199. Id.
200. Id. ¶ 887.
201. Prosecutor v. Dordević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 1759 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 23, 2011).
202. Id.
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helpful to the analysis concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline is
that, although it would be argued that the corporation officials’
actions were motivated by economic development to construct
the pipeline and not to persecute the tribes affected, the ICTY
has found that such motive does not bar a finding that the
corporation officials “at the same time also possess the intent to
discriminate” on the grounds of race, religion, cultural or other
grounds.203
In the case of the Dakota Access Pipeline, arguments could
be made that the original routing of the pipeline demonstrates
this intent to discriminate, as the original route passed north of
Bismarck, North Dakota, and not by the Standing Rock
reservation. Plaintiffs allege that the route was amended to pass
near the reservation after surveys of the route, and residents of
Bismarck, raised concerns about how it would affect the water
supply for residents of Bismarck,204 and on the risk of oil spill
from the pipeline.205 As a result of this amendment, there have
been accusations that the change was made on the basis of race.
It is alleged that the “risk [was] placed squarely on the Tribe,”206
and demonstrates discriminatory actions by the corporations
which own the pipeline and are constructing it.207
Based on these allegations and facts I argue that specific
discriminatory intent is present, and that it has been
demonstrated that the Sioux Tribes, whose cultural heritage
was damaged and destroyed, were targeted with discriminatory
intent because the route of the pipeline was specifically planned
to affect an area sacred to the Tribe, and therefore on the bases
of race, ethnicity, cultural and religion, instead of affecting the
203. Prosecutor v. Dordević, supra note 201, ¶ 887.
204. Dakota Access, LLC, Combined Application of Dakota Access LLC for a
Waiver or Reduction of Procedures and Time Schedules and for a Corridor
Certificate and Route Permit, (Dec. 2014), https://psc.nd.gov/database/
documents/14-0842/001-030.pdf; see also Amy Dalrymple, Pipeline Route Plan
First Called for Crossing North of Bismarck, BISMARCK TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/pipeline-route-plan-rstcalled-for-crossing-north-of-bismarck/article_64d053e4-8a1a-5198-a1dd-498d3
86c933c.html; Catherine Thorbecke, Why a Previously Proposed Route for the
Dakota Access Pipeline Was Rejected, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/previously-proposed-route-dakota-access-pipelinerejected/story?id=43274356.
205. Archambault Declaration of Feb. 9, 2017, supra note 37, ¶ 20.
206. Id.
207. Andrew Buncombe, North Dakota Pipeline: How it Favours White
Community over Native Neighbours—In One Map, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 30,
2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/north-dakota-acces
s-pipeline-protests-map-white-indigenous-latest-a7448161.html.
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land of the populations in Bismarck.
4. The deprivation of a fundamental human right
It is significant that the UNESCO Declaration of 2003
acknowledges that, although the intent may be for the
destruction of cultural property or heritage, an integral reality
of this act is that “intentional destruction of cultural heritage
constitutes a violation of human rights and may be accompanied
by other grave human rights violations.”208 This is noted in the
Declaration’s definition of “intentional destruction” which
defines it as “an act intended to destroy in whole or in part
cultural heritage, thus compromising its integrity, in a manner
which constitutes a violation of international law or an
unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates
of public conscience.”209 The definition recognizes that an
intentional act against property or heritage cannot be separated
from its link to human rights.
To this, the first element of the underlying crime of
persecution listed in the Elements of Crimes requires that a
person or group of people are deprived of a fundamental human
right under international law. This element identifies the first
main hurdle to recognizing the destruction of cultural heritage
as a crime against humanity instead of a war crime. As the
contextual elements require, and as discussed throughout this
article, a crime against humanity must be against persons—
”against any civilian population”210—and not against property.
Recognizing the destruction of cultural heritage as a crime
against persons is a departure from the original construction of
protections to cultural property under customary international
law which viewed property, or the state in which the object was
located, as the object of protection, and not individuals affected
by the harm to the cultural site.211 But, as discussed above,212
the protection of cultural heritage has developed so that
“[i]nternational norms relating to cultural heritage consider the
208. Al-Mahdi Report of Bennoune, supra note 83, at 12.
209. 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 93, pt. II.
210. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7.
211. BIICL REPORT, supra note 59, at 5 (providing protection within
international instruments was initially “envisaged as protection of state
sovereignty over the property that was at stake” but eventually moved its focus
to “the cultural property as the object of protection”).
212. See, e.g., supra pp. 168–79.
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destruction of any nation’s cultural property as a loss and an
injury to the collective heritage of humankind’s civilization” and
“as a matter of public interest, and not only as part of private
property rights.”213 The destruction of cultural heritage is, thus,
not only a violation of the customary international law aimed at
“preserving and safeguarding an object,”214 but is also a violation
of guaranteed human rights for the individuals affected and “is
a necessary and complementary approach to the
preservation/safeguard of cultural heritage.”215
In 2016 the Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of
Cultural Rights emphasized the importance of cultural heritage
from a human rights perspective,216 stating that:
Cultural heritage is significant in the present, both as a
message from the past and as a pathway to the future.
Viewed from a human rights perspective, it is important
not only in itself, but also in relation to its human
dimension, in particular its significance for individuals
and groups and their identity and development
processes. Cultural heritage is to be understood as the
resources enabling the cultural identification and
development processes of individuals and groups, which
they, implicitly or explicitly, wish to transmit to future
generations.217
Viewing the protection of cultural heritage from the
perspective that the object of protection includes individual
people and groups, highlights that the protection of cultural
heritage is an extension of international human rights law.218
Human rights law protects certain fundamental human rights
and the “intentional destruction [of cultural heritage] . . . [has]

213. Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 82, at 638; Gerstenblith, supra note
92, at 392 (“Cultural heritage destruction constitutes a crime against people,
not simply a loss of property.”).
214. Al-Mahdi Report of Bennoune, supra note 83, at 13.
215. Farida Shaheed, Report of the Independent Expert in the Field of
Cultural Rights, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/38 (Mar. 21, 2011).
216. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural
Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/31/59 (Feb. 3, 2016).
217. Id. ¶ 47; see also Al-Mahdi Report of Bennoune, supra note 83, at 4.
218. Farida Shaheed, supra note 215, ¶¶ 77–79; Karima Bennoune, supra
note 216, ¶ 51.
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adverse consequences on . . . human rights.”219 I review
fundamental rights of individuals protected under international
human rights law, which are affected by acts against cultural
heritage, below.
When examining the human rights which the international
community has recognized through international human rights
documents, the most relevant right is the human right of people
to their own culture. This right is set out in human rights
instruments including Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which guarantees the right “to participate in the
cultural life of the community,”220 and Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which notes
the right to “enjoy [one’s] own culture” in relation to the rights
of “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.”221 Article 15 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), also specifically notes an individual’s right to cultural
heritage. This provision “recognize[s] the right of everyone: (a)
To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”222
In a General Comment on Article 15 of the ICESCR, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained
that this right creates an obligation for State parties to respect,
protect and fulfil the right “to have access to their own cultural
and linguistic heritage and to that of others,”223 but also creates
219. See, e.g., 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 93, at 62.
220. G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27(1)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]
(“Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits.”).
221. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 27 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights] (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language.”).
222. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, art. 15 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].
223. Comm. on Econ., Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 21,
Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (art. 15, ¶ 1(a), of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 49(d), U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No.
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an obligation “requiring States to take measures to prevent third
parties from interfering” with this right.224
It is evident that when sites of great significance to a
population’s cultural heritage are extensively damaged or
destroyed, the population will be denied the right to access their
culture or to take part in their culture. For the Tribes affected
by the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline—specifically
those affected by the construction and grading which occurred
on the land near Canon Ball on September 3, 2016—the effects
included the loss of a stone structured used for religious worship
and spiritual guidance as well as the destruction of grave sites
of the Tribe’s ancestors.
As noted above, stone structures are important to the Tribes’
culture and religion as a place where individuals find “spiritual
connection through prayer and commitment at these stone
features,”225 and are evidence of a “highly structured spiritual
walk of life practice by” the members of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe.226 Their destruction would deprive the people of the Tribe
the ability to practice these rituals, and would therefore
constitute a clear violation of the right to access, and take part
in, one’s culture.227 Likewise, the way in which a group of people
honors and grieves its dead is a highly cultural and religious
practice. For the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, some members
were buried at the site of the stone structure where they
worshipped throughout their lives, and burial grounds were
often located towards the surface of the ground with rock cairns
placed on top.228 The fact that a number of the grave sites were
of important chiefs to the Tribes further touches on the Tribes’
protection of its cultural heritage.229
After the land near Canon Ball was affected by grading on
September 3, 2016, it was submitted that any site “that was in

21].
224. Id. ¶ 50.
225. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 12.
226. Id. ¶ 11.
227. E.g., id. ¶¶ 18–19 (“Today for the Lakota/Dakota, it is rare to find
individuals who have reached an important level of spiritual achievement
because they are denied access to their family or society sacred sites . . . when
any type of development or project destroys a sacred stone ring . . . it
inadvertently destroys the power of any sacred bundle connected to that
place . . . .”).
228. Id. ¶ 16.
229. See, e.g., Memorandum of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 28, at 3, 6.
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the pipeline corridor [was] destroyed.”230 It was reported that
grave sites were significantly disturbed, and the Tribe requested
permission to visit the site of grading to “look for human
remains” and “rebury relatives.”231 The destruction to these
stone structures and grave sites is a deprivation of the Tribe
members’ right to practice and access their culture.
In addition, the Committee’s commentary on a State’s duty
to protect the right to cultural heritage under Article 15 is of
further importance to the examination of the events concerning
the Dakota Access Pipeline. The Committee explained that a
State’s obligation to prevent third parties from interfering in the
right to cultural life includes the obligation for States and third
parties to respect and protect the cultural heritage of
marginalised groups and indigenous peoples against economic
development and corporations.232 General Comment 21 explains
that there is an obligation to:
(b) Respect and protect cultural heritage of all groups
and communities, in particular the most disadvantaged
and marginalized individuals and groups, in economic
development
and
environmental
policies
and
programmes;
Particular attention should be paid to the adverse
consequences of globalization, undue privatization of
goods and services, and deregulation on the right to
participate in cultural life.
(c) Respect and protect the cultural productions of
indigenous peoples, including their traditional
knowledge, natural medicines, folklore, rituals and other
forms of expression;
This includes protection from illegal or unjust
exploitation of their lands, territories and resources by
State entities or private or transnational enterprises and
corporations.233

230.
231.
232.
233.

Mentz Declaration of Sept. 4, 2016, supra note 24, ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 8.
CESCR General Comment No. 21, supra note 223, ¶ 50(b)(c).
Id.
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These provisions are particularly relevant to the Dakota
Access Pipeline, and set out that the United States has an
obligation to protect the “cultural productions” of the Tribes such
as the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe, against “unjust exploitation of their lands, territories and
resources by State entities or private or transnational
enterprises and corporations.”234 In this case, the right of these
“indigenous peoples” to access and take part in their culture was
not protected, and therefore was violated.
The destruction of cultural heritage is also a violation to the
right to religion.235 Human rights instruments such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,236
European Convention on Human Rights,237 American
Convention on Human Rights,238 African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights,239 and Universal Declaration of Human
Rights240 all include the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion and to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship,
teaching, practice or observation241 for all populations including
minority populations.242 The destruction of cultural heritage or
property of importance to a population’s religious practice
represents a violation of this right because the cultural heritage
“constitutes a representation of both a religious belief and of the
cultural identity of a people.”243 When cultural heritage or
property of a religious nature such as churches, shrines, temples,
or other sites used in the worship of a population, are destroyed,
234. Id.
235. Karima Bennoune, supra note 216, ¶ 51.
236. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 221,
art. 18(1).
237. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 9(1), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
238. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 12(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
239. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 8, June 27,
1981, 21 I.L.M 58.
240. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 220, art. 18.
241. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 237, art. 9(1) (“Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; . . . [and] to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”).
242. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 221,
art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”).
243. Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 82, at 638.
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this removes the population’s ability to practice its right to
religion.244
The destruction of stone structures important to the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe is an example of the destruction of
religious sites which violates the Tribe members’ ability to
practice their spiritual and religious beliefs. This is because the
stone structures are closely tied to the Tribe members’ “spiritual
walk of life practice”.245 When these sites are damaged or
destroyed “it destroys the spiritual connection” these individuals
have to the sites and therefore to their religious and spiritual
practice.246 Therefore, the destruction of stone structures near
Canon Ball deprives the people of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
of not only their place of worship but also of their ability to
practice.
Likewise, the human right to self-determination could also
be violated by the destruction of cultural heritage. The right to
self-determination is established in such international human
rights instruments as the International Covenant of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.247 Cultural heritage has been
recognized by the International Criminal Court as playing “a
central role in the way communities define themselves and bond
together, and how they identify with their past and contemplate
their future.”248 With cultural heritage constituting a central
part in how an individual decides to lead his or her life, its
destruction “represents an irreplaceable loss”249 to an
individual’s ability to determine certain aspects of how they will
lead their life, making its destruction a violation of an
individual’s right to self-determination. This is true for the
communities’ right as a whole to determine and express its
identity as well.
Much like the deprivation of the right to religion, the loss of
sites and objects which are critical to the practice of the
historical, religious and cultural heritage, prevent individuals,
and the larger community, of the ability to decide for themselves

244. Id.
245. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36.
246. Id. ¶ 41.
247. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 222, art. 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 221, art. 1(1).
248. Al-Mahdi Reparations Order, supra note 52, ¶ 14.
249. Al-Mahdi Report of Lostal, supra note 85, ¶ 45.
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how they will follow these traditions and spiritual practices. For
example, as stone structures are the necessary ‘portal’ to make
a spiritual connection through prayer, their destruction would
deprive individuals of the ability to practice this structured
spiritual practice.250 This destruction or damage would therefore
constitute a violation of the right to self-determination.
The destruction of cultural heritage could be considered a
violation of the right to education depending on the nature of the
site destroyed. The right to education is enshrined in human
rights instruments such as the International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, European Convention on
Human Rights, and African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.251 If the destroyed cultural heritage site was in a library
or a place of religious or cultural teaching, then this act would
impair or remove the ability to learn and would thus constitute
a violation of the right to education.252
For the Tribes whose cultural heritage was affected by the
Dakota Access Pipeline, it is recognized that these sites are of
cultural importance, but also of “historical significance;” noting
that their destruction severs the “connection to [the Tribe
members’] history.”253 As highlighted by the ICC, the loss of such
sites “deprive a community of its . . . memory, as well as the
physical testimony of its past,” and removes the ability to
“transmit its values and knowledge to future generations.”254
Therefore, it could be argued that destruction and damage to
these sites of historical significance deprive Tribe members of
the ability to learn about the history of their culture.
Last, it has been recognized that the protection of cultural
heritage and property “cannot be separated from the protection
of human life;”255 highlighting the guarantee under
international human rights law to the right to life. The
250. Mentz Declaration of Aug. 11, 2016, supra note 36, ¶ 11.
251. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note
239, art. 17(1); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 221, art. 13; European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 237, art. 2.
252. The classification of institutions dedicated to education has been
recognized as cultural property. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 120, art.
3(d); 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 60, ¶ 27; M. Adatci, supra note 63, at
115.
253. Archambault Declaration of Aug. 3, 2016, supra note 25, ¶ 15.
254. Al-Mahdi Reparations Order, supra note 52, ¶¶ 14, 22.
255. Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15-194, UNESCO
Amicus Curiae Observation Submitted Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 2 (Dec. 2, 2016).
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fundamental right to life is established in such international
human rights instruments as the ICCPR, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights,
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and American
Convention on Human Rights.256
The destruction of cultural heritage or property has been
extensively linked to human life with commentary that “cultural
heritage enables us to identify ourselves as ‘humankind’” and
finding that “cultural heritage is essential to the life of the
human being.”257 If cultural heritage is recognized as the
“connection to what makes us men and women” and “that which
makes us human,”258 and is essential to transmitting these
“values and knowledge to future generations,”259 then there
could be an argument that its destruction is a violation to these
fundamental human rights. This conclusion was noted in Judge
Cançado Trindade’s separate opinion in the case of Cambodia v.
Thailand before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).260 The
separate opinion noted that the Court took into “account not only
the territory at issue, but, jointly, the people on territory” in
regards to the subject of the Temple of Preah Veihear and in
doing so “encompassed the human right[] to life” in its decision
and consideration.261
The argument is tested by findings in the ICJ Genocide case
of Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia which concluded that the
destruction of cultural heritage on its own does not fit within the
definition of genocide under international criminal law. In this
case, it was argued that “destruction of historical, cultural and
religious heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina” was “an essential
part of the policy of ethnic purification” and was “an attempt to
wipe out the traces of [the] very existence” of the Bosnian
Muslims.262 While the Court found that such an act did not fall
256. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note
239, art. 4; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 238, art. 4;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 221, art. 6;
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 237, art. 2.
257. Al-Mahdi Report of Lostal, supra note 85, ¶ 47.
258. Id. ¶ 48.
259. Id. ¶ 44; see Al-Mahdi UNESCO Amicus Curiae Observation, supra
note 255, ¶ 2 (“protecting culture is a core value of the international community
that cannot be separated from the protection of human life”).
260. Cambodia v. Thailand, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade,
2013 I.C.J. 28, ¶¶ 31–33 (Nov. 11, 2013).
261. Id.
262. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
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under the legal definition of genocide as “the definition of acts of
genocide is limited to those seeking the physical or biological
destruction of a group,” it did find that “such destruction may be
highly significant inasmuch as it is directed to the elimination of
all traces of the cultural or religious presence of a group”263 and
endorsed the ICTY’s finding in the Krstic case which stated that
“where there is physical or biological destruction there are often
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and
symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may
legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically
destroy the group.”264 Therefore, while jurisprudence from the
ICJ excludes an argument that the destruction of cultural
heritage rise to the level of proving an international crime
against a human life under international criminal law, there is
still the possibility of an argument that such acts fit under
international human rights norms.
It is recognized that applying human rights principles of the
right to life to events where a human’s physical life has not been
harmed is a difficult argument to make and prove. Here, viewing
the destruction of significant sites of cultural heritage as a
violation of the right to life of these Tribe members is an
argument on what defines life, and whether life also includes the
things that make us human.265 It pushes the envelope to a more
progressive approach to the interpretation of the right to life, but
in this way could support the development of the protection of
cultural heritage in terms of its human dimension. Though it
might be difficult to prove that a violation to the right to life has
been committed in relation to the pipeline, it is helpful to
consider how the sites of cultural heritage and property are
critical to their way of life.
As a final note, it is acknowledged that there is an argument
for a hierarchy of human rights whereby the violation of some
human rights could be considered to have more gravity than
others.266 In this sense, the jurisprudence before the ICTY on the
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J.595, ¶
344 (Feb. 26, 2007).
263. Id.
264. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580
(Aug. 2, 2001)).
265. Al-Mahdi Report of Lostal, supra note 85, ¶ 47.
266. See, e.g., RHONA SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 219
(2018); Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1, 1–23 (1986); Koji Teraya, Emerging Hierarchy in International
Human Rights and Beyond: From the Perspective of Non-derogable Rights, 12
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crime against humanity of persecution found that “acts of
persecutions, considered separately or together, should reach
the level of gravity of other crimes listed in Article 5 of the
Statute.”267
Relating this gravity assessment to the violation of human
rights, the ICTY jurisprudence offered examples of those rights
which, when violated, would rise to the level of persecution. It
found that there was “no doubt that serious bodily and mental
harm and infringements upon individual freedom may be
characterised as persecution” stating that “infringements of the
elementary and inalienable rights of man, which are “the right
to life, liberty and the security of person,” the right not to be
“held in slavery or servitude,” the right not to “be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment” and the right not to be “subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile” . . . by their very essence may
constitute persecution when committed on discriminatory
grounds.”268 However, it went on to find that these were not the
only violations to human rights which could rise to the level of
persecution as a crime against humanity and that “acts rendered
serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the discrimination
they seek to instil within humankind” such as “confiscation or
destruction of private dwellings or businesses, symbolic
buildings or means of subsistence belonging to” a specific group
could reach the gravity required to be considered persecution as
crime against humanity.269 The Appeals Chamber recognised
that there might be questions about whether acts against
property and not directly against a person, but which affect a
group of peoples’ human rights, may rise to the level of crimes
against humanity, and found that “the destruction of property,
depending on the nature and extent of the destruction, may
constitute a crime of persecutions of equal gravity to other
crimes listed in Article 5 of the Statute.”270
Based on the facts concerning the pipeline, an argument
could be made that the destruction of cultural heritage and
property associated with the construction of the pipeline near
EUR. J. INT’L L. 917, 918 (2001).
267. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶138 (July 29,
2004) [hereinafter Blaškić Judgment of 2004].
268. Id. ¶ 136; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 220
(Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Blaškić Judgment of 2000].
269. Blaškić Judgment of 2004, supra note 267, ¶ 136; Blaškić Judgment of
2000, supra note 268, ¶ 227.
270. Blaškić Judgment of 2004, supra note 267, ¶ 149.
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Cannon Ball violated a series of fundamental human rights of
the affected tribes, and that though these acts are against
symbolic objects and property to the tribe members, when
considered together, they have a discriminatory effect which
rises to the level of persecution as a crime against humanity.
5. Connection with another act in Article 7
Finally, the ICC’s document on the Elements of Crimes
states that in order to qualify as a crime against humanity of
persecution the conduct must be “committed in connection with
any act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”271 The
requirement for linking acts of persecution to other crimes under
the Statute is a requirement that is unique to the ICC. The ICTY
specifically rejected this requirement, and commented that
although the “ICC Statute reflects customary international law
in abolishing the nexus between crimes against humanity and
armed conflict,” this requirement is “not consonant with
customary international law.”272 It has instead been explained
that the requirement was added to prevent persecution’s use as
an “auxiliary offence.”273 The Trial Chamber in Kupreskic
acknowledged that the requirement at the ICC “may be
indicative of the opinio juris of many States,” but that the ICTY
“rejected the notion that persecution must be linked to crimes
found elsewhere in the Statute” of the ICTY.274
In addition, the Trial Chamber’s comments in Kupreskic
suggested that the requirement “might easily be circumvented
by charging persecution in connection with ‘other inhumane acts
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’ under
Article 7(1)(k).”275
For the destruction or damage of cultural heritage, it
depends on the facts of the situation, as the destruction of
cultural heritage is not always committed in conjunction with
other crimes such as murder, torture or rape, to name a few.
However, for the situation concerning the Dakota Access
271. ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 18, art. 7(1)(h).
272. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Jan.
14, 2000).
273. Gottlieb, supra note 55, at 875 n.85.
274. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, supra note 272, ¶ 580.
275. Id. ¶ 580 (quoting the Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(k)).
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Pipeline, the treatment of activists and protesters
demonstrating against the construction of the pipeline and
against the destruction of the cultural heritage at issue, could be
viewed as constituting another ‘inhumane act’ causing great
suffering or serious physical or mental injury.
There have been reports that activists and protesters,
including members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, have been physically abused
through excessive force, including the use of rubber bullets, and
unlawfully arrested en masse and mistreated in detention.276
The reports have resulted in the UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues initiating an investigation into the reported
abuses,277 and in the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples expressing concern about the action of the
authorities against the protesters.278
Therefore, there is a strong case to argue that these abuses
against members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and the activists who support their
interests, would constitute other inhumane acts under Article
7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, and would provide the connection to
another act which is required to bring a claim for the crime of
persecution.
B. THE CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS OF A CRIME AGAINST
HUMANITY
Last, upon considering the requirements necessary to allege

276. Sam Levin, Dakota Access Pipeline: Native Americans Allege Cruel
Treatment, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/oct/31/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-investigation-human-rights-abuses.
277. See, e.g., Statement by Mr. Álvaro Pop Ac, Chair of the Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues, and Dr. Dalee Dorough and Chief Edward John,
Expert Members of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, on the
escalating violence against unarmed protestors at the Dakota Access Pipeline
construction site (North Dakota, USA) (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.un.org/
development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2016/11/Pres
s-Release-on-the-Dakota-Access-Pipeline-22-Nov.-2016.pdf; Sam Levin, Dakota
Access Pipeline Protests: UN group Investigates Human Rights Abuses,
(Oct.
31,
2016);
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
GUARDIAN
2016/oct/31/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-investigation-human-rights-abuses;
World Staff, The United Nations Heads to North Dakota to Investigate Possible
Human Rights Abuses, PRI (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-1103/united-nations-heads-north-dakota-investigate-possible-human-rightsabuses.
278. World Staff, supra note 277.
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that the destruction of cultural heritage could constitute a crime
of persecution during times of peace under the Rome Statute, it
must be considered whether the crime rises to the level of a crime
against humanity.
The ICC’s document ‘Elements of Crimes’ sets out the
elements for all crimes listed in the Rome Statute for which the
ICC has jurisdiction. This includes the elements for each listed
underlying crime under Article 7, including the underlying
crime of persecution. When listing the crime against humanity
of persecution the document notes that “[t]he last two elements
for each crime against humanity describe the context in which
the conduct must take place . . . clarify[ing] that the contextual
elements for a crime against humanity are listed last.279
Therefore, the contextual elements to make the crime of
persecution a crime against humanity are listed as element 5
and 6 under the elements for Article 7(1)(h), and require that:
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or
intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian
population.280
The definition of “attack” as set out at Article 7(2)(a) further
provides the contextual element that the attack is committed
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy
to commit such attack.”281
The contextual elements to a crime against humanity were
further reviewed in the Prosecution’s decision to initiate an
investigation into the destruction of cultural heritage in Mali.
Here it was noted that to establish a crime against humanity,
the contextual elements which must be proven include: “(i) an
attack against any civilian population; (ii) a State or
organizational policy; (iii) an attack of a widespread or
systematic nature; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and
the attack; and (v) the accused’s knowledge of the attack.”282
First, it must be noted that for the purpose of this analysis
279.
280.
281.
282.

ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 18, at 5.
Id. at 10.
Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(a).
Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 14, ¶ 127.
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concerning cultural heritage, this article sets out the contextual
elements required for proving the commission of a crime against
humanity of persecution but will not examine at length the case
law defining and clarifying the requirements of the contextual
elements which are common to all crimes against humanity. As
it is necessary and helpful to set out what contextual elements
are required and apply it to the case at hand, as done briefly
below, the focus of this article will remain on how the underlying
crime of persecution can be applied to situations where cultural
heritage is damage or destroyed during times of peace.
Therefore, in relation to the events concerning the Dakota
Access Pipeline, it can be argued that all contextual elements for
a crime against humanity are present. To start, the nature of the
group or collectivity—the Native American tribes such as the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe—have been discussed above and make clear that these
Tribes are a civilian population.283 Further, Article 7(2)(a) states
that an “attack” only must be “a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts,”284 and the Elements of Crimes
clarifies that the “acts need not constitute a military attack.”285
As detailed above,286 the actions taken by the construction
corporations on the pipeline are indeed a course of conduct which
has repeatedly resulted in the commission of attacks on the
cultural heritage which either harm, damage or destroy the sites
and objects.
The nexus between the act of the potential perpetrator and
the attack, as well as the perpetrator’s knowledge of the attack
can also be said to be demonstrated in this case. As discussed in
detail above, 287 the corporations involved in construction are
connected to acts which resulted in the destruction of cultural
heritage, particularly through steps taken to prepare the land
for construction and the actual construction of the pipeline. The
corporation’s knowledge about the attack can be established in
that they were made aware of the damage construction could,
and had caused, during, among other things, the protests of the

283. See supra pp. 163–68.
284. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(a).
285. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/9-19, Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶ 80 (Mar. 31, 2010); ICC, ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES, supra note 18, art. 7.
286. See, e.g., supra pp. 191–97.
287. Id.
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tribes and legal actions taken to argue that the pipeline would
damage or destroy important cultural sites and objects or to
highlight the damage and destruction caused after
construction.288
As for the requirement of a State or organizational policy,
jurisprudence before the ICC has given guidance on what is
necessary to set out that an attack was committed “pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack.”289 Criteria identified for establishing a policy
include that:
a) it must be thoroughly organised and follow a regular
pattern;
b) it must be conducted in furtherance of a common policy
involving public or private resources;
c) it can be implemented either by groups who govern a
specific territory or by an organisation that has the
capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population; and
d) it need not be explicitly defined or formalised (indeed,
an attack which is planned, directed or organised—as
opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence—will
satisfy this particular criterion).290
As for the term ‘organizational’, ICC jurisprudence sets out
that it is not “the formal nature of a group and the level of its
organization” that determines whether the requirements for an
organization under Article 7(2)(a) are established but instead
“whether a group has the capability to perform acts which
infringe on basic human values.”291
288. Id.
289. ICC, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 18, art. 7(2)(a).
290. Situation in the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr,
Corrigendum to “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte
d’Ivoire”, ¶ 43 (Nov. 15, 2011); Iryna Marchuk, No Crimes Against Humanity
During the Maydan Protests in Ukraine? Or the ICC Prosecutor’s Flawed
Interpretation of Crimes Against Humanity, 35 B.U. INT’L L.J. 39, 57 (2017).
291. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 285, ¶ 90; see also
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the

2019]

DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE

213

In the case of the Dakota Access Pipeline, the policy of the
organizations which own, construct and operate the pipeline has
been extensively set out.292 The corporations involved in the
construction of the pipeline followed a regular pattern as a result
of the common policy to construct the pipeline, by way of private
funds of the corporations involved. This common policy
effectuated a regular pattern of progressive acts taken during
the construction process which destroyed the cultural heritage
of the tribes located along the pipeline. Furthermore, the license
obtained by corporations from the US Government to construct
the pipeline and the finalised plans for routing of the pipeline
establish that the there was a formalized policy and that the
corporations in this case maintained the capacity to take steps
which would attack the cultural heritage of the tribes; thus also
demonstrating fulfilment of the definition of ‘organization’ under
Article 7(2)(1).
This leaves consideration of whether the acts at hand were
widespread and systematic in nature. The term ‘widespread’
speaks to the scale of the attack and is defined by the ICC as
“the large scale nature of the attack, which should be massive,
frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness
and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”293 The term
‘systematic’ refers to the nature of the attack and is defined by
the ICC as referring to the “organised nature of the acts of
violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.”294
As noted above, reports on the impact of constructing the
pipeline have detailed that construction would affect lands
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 81 (June 15, 2009); Prosecutor
v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶
396 (Sept. 30, 2008) (stating that “organization” can be defined as “any
organization with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population”); Charles Chernor Jalloh, What Makes a Crime
Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 381, 421
(2013).
292. See, e.g., supra pp. 191–97.
293. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 285, ¶ 95 (citing
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 291, ¶ 83); Prosecutor v.
Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 204 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v.
Katanga, supra note 291, ¶ 580.
294. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 285, ¶ 96 (citing
Prosecutor v. Katanga, supra note 291, ¶ 394); Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/0501/07-1-Corr, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the
Statute, ¶ 62 (Apr. 27, 2007); Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 648
(May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez , IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment,
¶ 94 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101
(July 29, 2004).
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sacred to Native American Tribes along many parts of the
pipeline, and would affect tribes other than the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.295 In addition to
allegations of serious damage and destruction of cultural and
religious property and heritage to the local Tribes, it has been
argued that the pipeline would negatively impact the
environmental integrity of the water sources near the pipeline,
such as with the Missouri River and Lake Oahe, and would
therefore affect the Tribe’s cultural and spiritual relationship
with these water sources.296 The events which resulted in the
destruction and damage to cultural heritage on September 3,
2016 near Canon Ball are only one instance highlighted, and
therefore the number of sites affected as a result of the
construction of the pipeline demonstrate the widespread and
systematic nature of the harm—i.e. the widespread or large
scale of the continuous and numerous attacks on cultural
heritage through construction along the entire pipeline, and the
systematic or organised nature of the attacks through the plans
to repeatedly take steps in the construction process which would
harm cultural heritage.
Therefore, it can be argued that the contextual elements for
a crime against humanity can be established in this case, and
the destruction and damage to cultural heritage of importance
to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribes could rise to the level of a crime against humanity of
persecution under Article 7 (1)(h) of the Rome Statute.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Above, it is proposed that a person most responsible for
destroying or damaging cultural heritage or property during a
time of peace may be held individually criminally responsible as
having committed the crime against humanity of persecution,
specifically as set out in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The
argument is made that such an application of Article 7(1)(h) is
compatible with international criminal law, international
human rights law and is supported by the development of
customary international law regarding the protection of cultural
property and heritage.

295. Eagle Declaration of Aug. 4, 2016, supra note 23, ¶¶ 24–40.
296. See Complaint of 27 July 2016, supra note 26, ¶¶ 77–79; Memorandum
of Feb. 14, 2017, supra note 22, at 4.
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In making this argument, the article examined the elements
which would need to be proven in order find that an act of
destruction or damage to cultural property or heritage is a crime
against humanity of persecution before the ICC finding that, to
apply Article 7(1)(h) it would have to be established first, that a
site or object of cultural heritage or property, not used for
military purposes, was destroyed or damaged extensively as a
result of the perpetrator’s actions. Second, it must be
demonstrated that the perpetrator intended to destroy or
damage the site or object extensively or had knowledge of the
likelihood that the actions would result in such harm and
nevertheless acted with reckless disregard. Third, the cultural
heritage or property which was damaged or destroyed must be
linked to a civilian population by explaining how the cultural
heritage or property was associated with the civilian population
and therefore establishing that the attack against the civilian
population was essentially targeting the group or collectivity
based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender or other grounds. Fourth, it must be shown that the harm
caused by the destruction or damage of the cultural heritage
resulted in the deprivation of a grave and fundamental human
right of the group. Fifth, the attack against the cultural heritage
or property must be connected to another act within Article 7,
and last, the attack must be shown to be part of a widespread or
systematic attack against the civilian population.
This article concludes that the events concerning the Dakota
Access Pipeline’s construction, and in particular the events near
Canon Ball, North Dakota on September 3, 2016, which resulted
in the destruction and damage of cultural heritage and property
such as stone structures and burial grounds, could rise to the
level of, and fit within the definition of, a crime against
humanity of persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome
Statute, and as a result, corporations responsible for the
ownership and construction of the pipeline could be vulnerable
to investigation or prosecution before the ICC.

